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INTRODUCTION
Insurgents have effectively employed asymmetric tactics, 
such as the use of suicide bombers, as viable threats in urban 
environments.    These threats are often devastating in their 
physical and emotional effects. They are hard to detect and 
have proven difficult to thwart or defeat.  The U.S. Army has 
recognized that improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) pose a 
persistent and devastating threat, impacting unit operations, 
U.S. policy and public perception (U.S. Army, 2005).
Suicide Vehicle-Born IEDs (SVBIEDs) would be easier to 
thwart or defeat if the political, cultural, and physical 
environments in which they were implemented were more 
readily constrainable as in full combat operations.  However, 
in Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) 
Operations, it is important to allow the nearly free flow of 
people (noncombatants) and goods through an economically 
developing or thriving community.    The involved urban 
environments can be physically complex and culturally 
diverse. Threats that employ SVBIEDs take this into account 
and use this to their  advantage.  Our current, limited 
understanding of the human behaviors that drive the 
insurgent’s decisioning and responses, and the insurgent’s 
ability to capitalize on the nature of the urban environment in 
stability and support operations adds to the complexity and 
challenges of detecting and defeating this threat.   There is a 
need to increase our understanding of the behavioral  aspects, 
or responses to perceptions regarding the environment, of 
such threats so we can evoke responses that decrease their 
probabilities of mission success and increase our advantage in 
this contemporary operational environment. 
The Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC) 
along with the United States Military Academy (USMA) 
Operations Research Center of Excellence (ORCEN) recently 
conducted a study to provide insights into insurgent 
behaviors, or decisioning, and mission outcomes given 
different strategies associated with traffic flow and traffic 
control points (TCPs) applied by counterinsurgent forces.  
The goal of the IDFW 15 effort was to determine the value of 
adding Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) to the 
aforementioned environment.    Specifically, we looked to 
derive insights about semi-autonomous UAS with swarm 
behaviors.  
This extension can assist counterinsurgent forces in 
several ways.    It will drive needs for UAS allocation and 
development by identifying critical elements of semi-
autonomous swarming behavior.    In addition, it may 
highlight mission behavior that shows the most promise by 
expanding the tasks and environment beyond this current 
set.   Due to the complex nature of the problem, the current 
state of understanding in the field, and the exploratory nature 
of the research, insights vice specific answers are central in 
this research.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
This study addresses whether we can isolate factors needed 
to identify effective semiautonomous UAS behaviors that 
add value to the aforementioned SVBIED TCP study.   Ideal 
UAS implementation would maximize the area searched and 
minimize time between UAS passes within a defined 
geographic zone in order to locate and track SVBIEDs.  
In the study scenarios, insurgents selected a fixed target, 
planned a route based on awareness of friendly TCPs, and 
moved through an urban environment to attack the target 
using one SVBIED.  While executing the mission, the SVBIED 
could be detected by roving UAS or encounter TCPs of which 
they were not previously aware.    If the SVBIED was 
identified by a UAS, selected TCPs within the local 
neighborhood would change from a static to a mobile 
posture.   The mobile TCPs would receive updated SVBIED 
locations from the UAS in contact.  They would then close 
with and interdict the SVBIED.   
Within this context, we investigated the following study 
questions:  
• Is SVBIED mission outcome a function of varied UAS 
swarming behaviors where mission outcome is 
SVBIED reaches primary target and detonates, 
detonates at an alternate target, or fails to detonate at 
any target?
• Does swarming behavior enhance UAS performance 
when searching an area for a specific target?
• In cases where the SVBIED reaches its primary target, 
what factors are important?
• In cases where the SVBIED detonates at alternate 
location, what factors are important?
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METHOD
Team 4 used the Map Aware Non-uniform Automata 
(MANA) agent based simulation as it was also the 
simulation used for prior  experiments with this study. 
MANA provided the flexibility we needed in agent 
personality, communications architecture, and agent 
behavior to effectively model employment of UAS in a 
variety of ways. 
This research incorporated principles from several fields 
to explore factors associated with effectiveness of strategies in 
asymmetric environments.    Agent based modeling, large-
scale experimental design, and artificial electro-magnetic field 
theory were used to develop methods for capturing complex 
adaptive system behavior associated with nonlinear 
interactions.   The artificial electro-magnetic field theory was 
used for global insurgent path planning and UAS separation. 
An agent based modeling environment was selected for 
implementing and executing the scenarios.    The large-scale 
experimental design was used to establish factor settings 
(e.g., UAS speed, Swarm Behavior) for the scenarios.  
Previous studies focused on exploring the impact of 
friendly and adversary capabilities and TCP strategies on 
SVBIED mission outcomes.  These experiments ranged from a 
single target with a static defense array and sparse road 
network to multiple targets with a dynamic defense array 
within a dense road network.    Capabilities examined 
included friendly and adversary communications and sensor 
performance during mission execution.    The strong 
association of TCP strategy with SVBIED mission outcome 
spurred this extension of the investigation and led to the 
current set of experiments. 
The visual representation of the current study appears 
similar to the previous experiments.    Visually, it looks as 
though we’ve only added 3 UAS.  However, there is a 
different command and control structures for the 
counterinsurgent forces.  In addition, previously static TCPs 
can move to an SVBIED when it is identified.  
The area of interest is a 5km x 5km box representing an 
urban area with a dense road network.  The network consists 
of primary and secondary roads.  There is an array of TCPs 
meant to interdict SVBIED attacks, background traffic, and a 
target.   In addition, there are a number of spotters to provide 
information to the SVBIED and its escorts as it travels toward 
the target.  
Our baseline simulation used UAS in the simulation 
with prescriptive programmed behavior to represent the 
present state of the art.   In addition, they reported data to one 
central ground station.  We assumed transmitted data would 
be in the form of video transmission and associated metadata 
such as time and geographic locations of both the UAS and 
its observations.    We also assumed there was no direct 
communication between any of the 3 UAS.
We developed factors on interest based on insights 
gleened from previous simulation attempts at swarming 
UAS.   We employed a consistent TCP allocation to negate the 
influence of that factor.    Within MANA, factors considered 
were the following: UAS Detection Range, UAS Classification 
Probability, UAS and TCP Communications Delay, UAS to 
UAS Repel tendency, UAS Inorganic Situational Awareness 
(ISA) Persistence, and UAS Speed.   
Figure 1: Urban Environment with Dense Road Network
The factors UAS Detection Range and Speed are self-
explanatory.    Ideally we wanted to maximize both, but we 
realized significant increases in speed can result in a 
degradation of the UAS observation capability.   In addition, 
we didn’t want to model unrealistic detection capabilities. 
Instead, we modeled a  modest ability for the UAS to detect 
and classify a target as an SVBIED.  Because this study may 
be used to drive future capability development, we thought 
this feature was important to explore.   
UAS detection capability was modeled because we 
assumed that some intelligence about pending SVBIED 
missions existed.  That intelligence, however strong, would be 
fed to the UAS and their  operators.  It would provide some 
guidance as to when or where to begin a search as well as 
what the SVBIED may look like.  We think this is plausible.  
Even in areas where coalition forces are unable to affect 
the SVBIED decision cycle, forensic and historical data exists. 
This data could be used as a substitute for real time or 
actionable intelligence.  A semi-autonomous UAS would use 
the information and an estimation of its veracity to drive its 
search pattern.  A UAS ground station operator would 
essentially do the same thing with his reconnaissance plan.  
The factors we manipulated to explore swarming with 
the MANA software were UAS Repel, and UAS ISA 
Persistence.  These two factors seem to be keys in simulating 
swarming behavior.  The essence of swarming behavior is an 
entity’s situational awareness (SA) as a function of the 
group’s situational awareness given current or recent input of 
other local entities as they collaborate on tasks.  Updates to 
the global and individual SA elicit changes in behavior for 
each entity.  
This self-organized behavior optimizes the group’s 
effort.  For instance, ants, when searching for food, move 
along trails and leave a  scent, a pheromone, to mark their 
presence.  If other ants in the area come upon the trail and 
detect high levels of pheromone, they too begin to follow the 
trail.  Low levels will cause them to ignore the trail.  This is 
because high levels of pheromone indicate high traffic flow. 
The ants are programmed to assume that high traffic flow 
means success location of a  close by food source.  This 
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strategy ensures that the colony exhausts any nearby food 
before other more arduous exploration begins.  
In the simulation, the assigned collaborative task is 
identification of SVBIEDs within an urban setting.  Here, 
swarming behavior ensures that the UAS are continually 
conducting surveillance throughout.  As a strategy, UAS 
should remain dispersed so as not to overlap.  Still, they need 
to revisit each other’s paths after time has passed for vigilant 
observation.  Varying the UAS’ repellence between each other 
allowed us to set how far apart they would remain from each 
another.  
If the inter-search time between observations is too long 
there may be gaps in the reconnaissance that would permit an 
SVBIED undetected travel to a TCP or   its intended target. 
We addressed this with the ISA persistence.  It varied the 
strength of the memory or the pheromone left when a UAS 
last passed over a location.  Opposite from the ant example, 
UAS would be compelled to return to areas where the 
pheromone is weak.  
Swarm behavior can be an optimization tool that 
balances simple jobs to meet the larger task of finding 
SVBIEDs.  Varied levels of the factors as well as assigned UAS 
routes allowed for representation of 3 different types of 
swarming behavior as well as two variations of a baseline (no 
swarm) behavior, No Swarm A, No Swarm B, Daisy Chain, 
Central Hub, and All Net. 
UAS in the No Swarm variants did not interact.  They 
shared no information nor did they sense or repel each other. 
Daisy Chain, Central Hub, and All Net represented swarming 
of semi-autonomous UAS. Thus, the 3 UAS in each scenario 
used information from the others to self-organize within the 
reconnaissance zone and search for SVBIEDs.  
UAS in No Swarm mode strictly followed 
preprogrammed search patterns to search the urban area. 
Swarming UAS were given general guidance by assigning 
paths but instructions also included generous levels of 
stochastic behavior.  This allowed the UAS to stray from paths 
based on information from its UAS swarm-mates.  Differences 
in the organization of the UAS defined their designation 
Daisy Chain, Central Hub, or All Net.  Factor levels were 
varied for all UAS strategies in order to measure their 
influence on mission outcome as well.
TCPs
UAV 1 UAV 2 UAV 3 UAV 1 UAV 2 UAV 3
TCPs
UAV 1 UAV 2 UAV 3
TCPs TCPs
UAV 1 UAV 2 UAV 3
Central Hub Daisy Chain
All Net No Swarm
Figure 2: UAS Organization Methods
Though similar, these arrangements represent significant 
differences in infrastructure or robust reliability of data 
exchange.  Given limitations of UAS processing or line of 
sight communications, they lend themselves to specific 
application.  For instance, All Net is the most reliable system 
but it demands UAS that can provide near real time 
identification of specific targets for transmission to its friendly 
command and control neighborhood.  It also requires constant 
communications over the local neighborhood.  There are no 
UAS that are currently up to the task as a semi-autonomous 
system.  In addition, the data bandwidth requirement is 
infeasible as it grows exponentially with each additional UAS 
or receiver.  
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
To address the study questions, seven factors as shown in 
table 1 were incorporated into a nearly-orthogonal Latin 
hypercubes (NOLH) experimental design.    A full factorial 
design would have yielded thousands of design points.  
Using NOLH, we reduced the number of design points to 17 
and executed 25 replications per design point for a total of 
425 runs. Each replication was a realization of a stochastic 
process of UAS behavior, route selection and traffic flow as 
modeled in MANA.  This was done for each of the 5  UAS 
strategies. 
Due to excessive run times for each simulation (over 96 
hours), we have yet to analyze all of the output data.  Our 
hope is that some, if not all, of the factors are significant and 
that the different UAS strategies yield statistically different 
outcomes in reference to the rate an SVBIED will detonate at 
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Table 1: Factors Employed in Scenarios
INITIAL FINDINGS
Though we cannot offer any analytical bounty from this 
effort, there are a number of insights thus far.  The first 
speaks to the length of time our simulation requires for 1 
run.  Each simulation can take up to 26000 steps (over 7 
hours in real time).  With over 2000 iterations to run, this is a 
labor intensive effort.  
The runs are long for two reasons.  The background 
urban traffic flow reaches steady state at about 8000 steps.  For 
the model to be valid, this warm up period is a necessity.  The 
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traffic congestion is indispensable in order to determine the 
strengths and weakness of strategies in an urban region. 
Realistic traffic throughput defines the current environment 
for all players.  
In addition to reaching steady state, the stochastic nature 
of the SVBIED movement and probability of UAS or TCP 
success make end time estimations difficult to gauge.  The 
long runtime is a  reflection of our desire to capture as many 
final outcomes as possible.  We will analyze the data 
associated with SVBIED interdiction or detonation to fine tune 
the simulation run times.  
There were a couple challenges in the model as well.  It 
was difficult to mimic the UAS ability to detect and classify a 
target as an SVBEID.  We didn’t want the camouflage of the 
SVBIED so low that the UAS were not valued added but we 
didn’t want the UASs to be omnipotent either.  
We compromised by linking the SVBIED escorts to the 
UAS.  The escorts knew where the SVBIED was at all times. 
We arranged for at least one of the UAS to have contact with 
an escort and receive updates.  To level the playing field 
some, we varied reliability of the escorts’ ISA as it was 
transmitted to the UAS.  Then the UAS more or less knew the 
VBIED location and description.  We felt this method 
mimicked the sparse intelligence units currently have about 
SVBIED operations.  
Another challenge was modeling swarming in MANA. 
We were able to mimic pheromones and their fleeting nature 
by using the Persistence value parameter.  However, we were 
unable to verify that we could fine tune a  UAS’ receptors to 
react to pheromones.  We had very little information about 
the ranges at which the pheromones were helping drive UAS 
behaviors.    
THE WAY AHEAD
After collecting the forthcoming data, we hope to further 
explore important factors by recreating this experiment in 
different environments using different goals and tasks for 
the UAS.  This would help us determine which UAS 
strategies are most effective in each environment.  For 
example, in a civil  search and rescue scenario, the Daisy 
Chain may be sufficient.  However in a hostile situation, the 
redundancy of other methods may prove necessary.  Tasks to 
be explored include various types of reconnaissance, direct 
fire engagements, search and rescue, and forward 
observation.  Settings of interest include both conventional 
and unconventional conflict, natural disaster, and border 
patrols.   
The intricacy and dire outcomes of the SVBIED problem 
demand high fidelity models to gain traction and begin 
validation of new counterinsurgent strategies.  We are 
investigating the construction of a federation of simulation 
models to study this problem.  Though no small effort on its 
own, we will try to mimic the success of federated training 
models.  We will leverage models that best represent the sub-
elements of this complex adaptive system.  We hope to build a 
user friendly model that varies parameters within a 
constructive simulation and farming output data by 
leveraging the best tools available. 
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